Opinion: Egypt has to learn the lesson

It’s almost boring. Earlier this week, Ahmed Maher, Ahmed Douma and Mohammed Adel, three veteran activists, were each sentenced to three years in jail and fined EGP 50,000. Two thoughts occurred to me: one, if the fine was multiplied by 10,000, then that would be the only way such sentences could possibly have any sort of stabilising effect on Egypt. And two, this government continues to treat the current political and economic situation as sustainable. The reality is, it isn’t. That’s a lesson that Mubarak, Tantawi and Morsi all failed to learn – and each time, the costs of learning the lesson just increase. The first time, one gets a sense of wanting to urge the powers that be to take notice; the second time, one demands that they do so out of righteousness; the third time, to avert disaster. When you get to the fourth time, it’s almost boring, and one thinks: “Maybe they really do need to hit rock bottom before they realise – this just doesn’t work.”

On 25 January 2011, the key motivating factors for bringing people out on the street were (a) a rejection of the security apparatus that so humiliated Egyptians and (b) a demand for a better life in terms of economic prosperity for a larger swathe of the population, as opposed to an elite minority. The economy was actually growing under Hosni Mubarak – but the effects of that growth did not filter down to the average Egyptian. Indeed, while the GDP of Egypt was actually increasing, Egyptians on average were becoming more despondent about their futures – repeated Gallup surveys in 2010 showed that clearly. As for the security services, they were singlehandedly responsible for the degradation of the average Egyptian’s concept of dignity.

Had the army that removed Mubarak been interested in responding to the legitimate demands of the protesters, it would have established a roadmap to begin addressing those two issues. Indeed, should have been the military – because it was the military that could claim widespread support in February 2011; and in order to tackle those problems, it would have required a front of massive consensus. Otherwise, any effort to reform the economy or the security sector would be met with rejection. Of course, the military didn’t have any interest in addressing either of those issues, and it began an abysmal roadmap instead. The two fundamental flaws of the Egyptian state were left more or less untouched. The lesson was not learnt, a chance was lost, and any effort to address those issues was just bound to become even harder the next time it became necessary to do so.