Gateway to Africa: The Dynamics of Russian-Egyptian Relations
Since 2022, Egypt has received far less media attention in the context of ties with Russia than Iran, Turkey, or the UAE. Yet bilateral engagement between Moscow and Cairo has progressed steadily and consistently during this period. In terms of trade volume, Egypt now ranks among Russia’s top three partners in the Middle East. Moreover, Russian officials view the country as a key «gateway» to the African continent—a point underscored when Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, speaking at the Russia-Africa ministerial conference held in Cairo in late December 2025, emphasized the unique nature of the two countries’ relationship.
The foundation for elevating cooperation to a qualitatively new level does appear solid. At the same time, significant constraints continue to limit deeper economic integration.
Robust Growth in Trade
Egypt has been one of the few directions where Russian foreign trade showed resilient expansion following the onset of full-scale war in Ukraine. Bilateral turnover stood at roughly $ 6 billion in 2022, rose above $ 7 billion in 2023, and reached $ 9.3 billion by the end of 2024. The upward trend continued into 2025, with trade growing 12 percent in the first nine months—pointing to a full-year figure likely in the $ 10−11 billion range (final statistics are typically released the following spring).
Egypt thus remains, by a wide margin, Russia’s leading trade and economic partner in Africa, accounting for more than one-third of Moscow’s total commerce with the continent. In the broader Middle East context, Cairo consistently places in the top three partners for Russia—behind only Turkey (around $ 55 billion in recent years) and closing in on the UAE (near $ 10 billion). A key detail: the trade balance stays heavily in Russia’s favor, with roughly $ 6 billion of the $ 9.3 billion 2024 figure representing Russian exports.
The primary engine of this growth has been Russian grain shipments. Egypt’s steadily rising population, combined with bread and bakery products traditionally forming a large share of the average Egyptian diet, drives sustained demand for cereals. The sharp contraction in Ukrainian export capacity—previously the second-largest supplier to Egypt—has further strengthened Russia’s position, as Ukraine’s agricultural sector suffered heavily from the war.
By the end of 2024 Egypt had become Russia’s single largest wheat buyer worldwide, taking in 10 million tons. As Russia’s ambassador to Egypt put it: «No one else in the world purchases grain on this scale, and Russia sells more wheat to no other country.» Wheat exports alone were valued at approximately $ 3.1 billion—about one-third of total bilateral trade.
The second-largest export category ($ 1.3 billion) was iron and steel, fueled by two major Egyptian construction drives. One is the ambitious new administrative capital being built 45 kilometers east of Cairo. The other is the El-Dabaa nuclear power plant, constructed by Rosatom. This flagship project, with total investments around $ 30 billion (including a $ 25 billion Russian state loan), began in 2022; the four VVER-1200 units are scheduled for completion by 2030. It marks not only Egypt’s first nuclear facility but also Rosatom’s inaugural atomic plant on the African continent. Moscow hopes successful delivery will cement strategic ties with Cairo and pave the way for Russian nuclear technology in other regional markets.
Russia also supplies Egypt with vegetable and animal oils, timber, petroleum products, fertilizers, legumes, machinery, aluminum, and plastics. In return, the Russian market mainly receives Egyptian fruits, vegetables, and nuts.
Established Human Connections
One essential prerequisite for deep and diversified international cooperation is a broad network of interpersonal and societal ties—particularly in countries where informal practices and institutions play a significant role. In other words, effective engagement requires knowing «the right people» and maintaining working relationships with them. While such connections often form by chance, sheer volume dramatically increases the odds of success: the more interactions between citizens of the two countries, the greater the likelihood of encountering precisely the contact who proves valuable.
Personal contacts between Russians and Egyptians are plentiful. Egypt remains one of the most popular destinations for Russian tourists: in 2025, around 2 million Russian citizens visited the country—second only to Turkey (roughly 7 million). Given that this has been a steady flow for nearly two decades, a substantial community of Russian-speaking Egyptians has emerged. One indirect result has been a surge in student exchanges: as of 2025, more than 11,000 Egyptian students are enrolled in Russian universities.
Thus, the sheer scale of contacts—short-term (tourists) and long-term (students, businesspeople, property buyers, mixed marriages)—serves as a crucial long-term factor reinforcing and expanding bilateral relations.
Russian authorities have been seeking ways to stimulate and stabilize economic ties with Egypt. One prominent effort has been the push toward settlements in national currencies—a topic that gained urgency amid Western pressure severely complicating dollar and euro transactions. There has been some progress, albeit slow. The banking systems of the two countries remain poorly integrated, and full linkage appears unlikely in the near term under existing sanctions. Moreover, the sharp devaluation of the Egyptian pound has hindered national-currency payments. As a result, around 60 percent of transactions between Moscow and Cairo are still conducted in euros or dollars.
Among major government-led projects, the El Dabaa nuclear plant remains the flagship. Recognizing that one power station alone cannot produce a qualitative leap in relations, however, other initiatives have been proposed. The closest to realization is the creation of a Russian Industrial Zone near the Suez Canal. The concept envisions Russian companies setting up production on roughly 50 hectares of land, with output sold in Egypt on the same terms as local goods. How effective the zone will ultimately prove remains unclear, though its backers argue it will serve as an entry point not just to the Egyptian market but to Africa as a whole. Implementation has been gradual: first Russian firms are not expected to begin operations until around 2030.